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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
ENFORCEMENTADMINISTRATION, AND
CHARITIS--CONTRUCTION,
WHETHER OR NOT CHARITABLE CORPORATION WHICH HAS INSURED AGAINST
TORT LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF ITS AGENTS MAY INVOKE DEFENSE OF
IMMUNITY-In the case of Moore v. Moyle,' the Illinois Supreme Court
has taken a most significant tack from the current of Illinois decisions
regarding the liability of charitable corporations for the tortious acts of
their servants and agents. 2 The principal defendant therein, Bradley
Polytechnic Institute, had purchased certain gymnastic equipment for use
in a proposed student circus and had placed the supervision of the erection and use thereof in the hands of the individual defendants, two physical
education instructors. While the equipment was under their supervision,
the plaintiff fell and was injured by the collapse of the apparatus. When
suing to recover for such injuries, plaintiff charged that the educational
institution was fully insured, and also had other non-trust property, so that
a judgment could be satisfied without impairing any charitable trust fund.
The trial court dismissed the action as to the principal defendant and
entered a judgment in its favor on the ground that the doctrine of
respondeat superior did not apply to a charitable corporation. That judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Second District,5 but
was reviewed by the Supreme Court on a certificate of importance. The
judgment below was reversed and remanded when a majority of that
court held that the prior Illinois cases in the field merely made the defense
of immunity available as a defense but did not make it operate to destroy
the cause of action. The thought was expressed that the law in Illinois went
only far enough to hold that trust funds of charitable corporations were
entitled to be deemed exempt from liability, hence it followed that nontrust fund property, such as the proceeds of insurance, could be subjected
to judgments based on ordinary rules regarding respondeat superior.
Needless to state, the case will prove to be one of decisive importance
to much pending and possible future litigation,4 for the court has gone a

1405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950), noted in 38 Ill. B. J. 581. Crampton, J.,
wrote a dissenting opinion. Wilson, J., also dissented.
2 For

an exhaustive review of the general problem, see annotations in 14 A. L. R.

572; 23 A. L. R. 923; 30 A. L. R. 455; 33 A. L. R. 1369; 42 A. L. R. 971; 62 A. L. R.
724; 86 A. L. R. 491; 109 A. L. R. 1199; 133 A. L. R. 821. See also Feezer, "The
Tort Liability of Charities," 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 191 (1928) ; Zollman, "Damage
Liability of Charitable Institutions," 19 Mich. L. Rev. 395 (1921). A review of the
pertinent Illinois decisions appears in a note to Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill.
App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947), in 26 CnIcAGo-KENT LAw REVIEW 279.
S See Moore v. Moyle, 335 Ill. App. 342, 82 N. E. (2d) 61 (1948), noted in 27
CMCAGO-KFNT LAW REvIEw 3, 28 CHICAG-KENT LAW REVIEW

1 and 103, and 38 Ill.

B. J. 187.
4 Counsel for persons injured or killed in the recent Efflngham Hospital fire will
certainly take note of the decision.
268
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long way toward circumscribing the unjustifiable immunity which has
previously been granted to charitable corporations. However desirable the
immediate result may be, it is extremely regrettable that the court did not
completely abolish rather than just limit the immunity. One cannot but
be persuaded by the cogent logic of the dissent that ". . . the crucial policy
of exempting charitable institutions from tort liability is of sufficient
gravity to require a further appraisal by this court of the reasons which
sustain it. The issue here presented should be resolved upon the merit of
those reasons rather than by the adoption of criteria which merely purport
to extend or modify the doctrine and which . . . can result in little but
confusion in the law." 5 It is hoped that the Illinois court will soon reconsider the problem and accept the persuasive logic expressed by the
Vermont Supreme Court, in another recent case, 6 where every argument
for charitable tort immunity was carefully examined and effectively refuted by a court which, for the first time in that jurisdiction, refused to
embark on the muddled sea of charitable immunity.

DIVORCFE-DEFENSES-WHETHER

CONDONATION

OF EXTREME

AND RE-

PEATED CRUELTY WILL BE REVOKED BY A SUBSEQUENT DESERTION ON PART

OF FORGIVEN SPOUSE-A new problem involving aspects of divorce law was
presented to, and resolved by, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth
District in the recent case of Middleton v. Middleton.' The complaint there
charged extreme and repeated cruelty as ground for divorce but acknowledged that the plaintiff's acts of cohabitation with defendant subsequent
thereto amounted to a condonation. Plaintiff, therefore, specially charged
that an alleged wilful desertion of plaintiff by defendant for a period of
one day prior to suit' operated to revoke the previous condonation and
thereby reactivated plaintiff's right to a divorce on the ground of the
prior cruelty. A temporary injunction was granted immediately upon
suit, designed to restrain the defendant from molesting the plaintiff or from
re-entering the premises of their domicile. After receiving plaintiff's evidence in support of her complaint, the trial court granted the defendant's
5 See dissenting opinion of Crampton, J., in 405 Il. 555 at 568, 92 N. E. (2d) 81
at 88.
6 Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, - Vt. -, 70 A. (2d) 230 (1950).
Among other things, this court makes the most poignant observation that a "charity
should not be permitted to inflict injury upon one without redress in order that it
may do charity to others." See - Vt. - at -, 70 A. (2d) 230 at 235.
1339 Il. App. 448, 90 N. E. (2d) 248 (1950).
2 The desertion was alleged to have occurred on April 18th and suit was begun
on April 19th of the same year. To constitute a separate cause for divorce, the
desertion must be wilful and for the space of one year: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1,
Ch. 40, § 1.
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motion to dismiss the suit for lack of proof.

On appeal, that order was

affirmed when the Appellate Court concluded that the proof failed to show
any additional misconduct on the defendant's part beyond a brief quarrel
leading to defendant's removal of himself and his clothing from the family
domicile and that the presence of the temporary injunction literally operated to prevent defendant from returning to the family domicile or making
any move toward reconciliation. It was, therefore, decided that the
condonation had not been effectively revoked.
While a majority of cases from other states do recognize that a desertion for a period less than the statutory one will operate to revoke a prior
condonation, 3 the case at hand is the first one in which the question has been
presented to a reviewing court of this state. Prior decisions have expressed
the view that condonation for previous acts of cruelty is granted on the
implied condition that the offending party will thereafter treat the other
with conjugal kindness, 4 but whether or not a revocation of the condonation
has occurred has been said to depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Emphasis was here laid on the fact that the
defendant had, on several occasions in the past, left his home for varying
periods of time but had always returned of his own accord, and there was
no evidence of any extra-marital misconduct by him during his absence.
When it appeared that plaintiff's attitude at the time of defendant's leaving might be said, to some extent, to have disclosed a degree of willingness
to participate in the quarrel and the subsequent departure of the defendant, the court felt constrained to say that the circumstances were not of
5
such nature as to justify a right to revoke the prior condonation. It might
be pointed out that a person in the position of the plaintiff should, in all
equity, have respectful precaution toward coming into court with clean
hands, so that plaintiff's own acts could well be considered as a contributing factor to the desertion. There is enough in the case, however, to indicate
the possible adoption of the majority view by this state should the aggrieved
spouse be able to show absence of fault and a period of desertion sufficiently long to indicate a lack of intention to return, even though the
period be not long enough to constitute a separate and distinct cause for
divorce. A highly unfortunate result would follow if it should be necessary to show a complete period of desertion to nullify a prior condonation.
If that were so, the injured spouse would be faced with the proposition
that a condonation once given could be abrogated only on the basis of a
repetition of a type of marital misconduct similar to the one which bad
been forgiven.
3 See 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 213; 27 C. J. S., Divorce, § 62.
4 Olman v. Olman, 396 IMI.176, 71 N. E. (2d) 50 (1947) ; Young v. Young, 323
I1. 608, 154 N. E. 405 (1926) ; Abbott v. Abbott, 192 I1. 439, 61 N. E. 350 (1901).
5 Abbott v. Abbott, 192 IMi.439, 61 N. E. 350 (1901).
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EMBEZZLEMENT-ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE-WHETHER

FAILURE TO PUT

SUFFICIENT FUNDS INTO A DIVIDEND ACCOUNT, AND COMMINGLING OF FUNDS
IN SEPARATE DIVIDEND ACCOUNTS, AMOUNTS TO AN EMBEZZLEMENT BY A

TRUSTEE-In the recent case of People v. Barrett,' a successor
trustee under a plan of reorganization of a bank declared a 10% dividend
for certain liquidating certificate holders. He deposited a sufficient sum
of money in an account for the payment of this dividend. Approximately
two and one-half years later he declared a similar dividend for the same
persons, but this time he deposited an amount short of that required to
pay such dividend and commingled the second fund with the funds still
remaining on hand from the unpaid portions of the first dividend, the total
being insufficient to pay both in full. This same process was repeated still
another year and one-half later when a third dividend was declared. The
result of these transactions was that, instead of depositing a total of approximately $280,000 which would have been necessary to pay all three
dividends, the trustee deposited approximately $212,000. For these acts
and omissions, the trustee was indicted for embezzlement under an indictment which charged the taking of funds belonging to the unpaid certificate
holders of the first dividend. The theory of the prosecution was that the
defendant had wilfully converted the unpaid sum of the first dividend to
his own use by applying it to the discharge of his obligations under the
second and third dividends. The trial court found him guilty and entered
sentence but, on error to the Supreme Court, the judgment was reversed
and the cause remanded when the upper court held that the acts were not
sufficient to manifest the necessary criminal intent required to make the
defendant guilty of the crime charged. 2 It laid particular stress on the
requirement of secrecy and cited People v. Parker3 for the view that while
the acts of the trustee might be acts of maladministration, amounting to a
breach of trust, they would be insufficient to support conviction unless it
could be shown that he had converted the money to his own use or had
LIQUIDATION

secreted it with intent so to use.4

Agreeing with the holding in People v.

Ervin,5 the court said the criminal intent had to be proven as a necessary
1405 111. 188, 90 N. E. (2d) 94 (1950).

2 It is understood that at a subsequent trial without a jury, after remandment,
the defendant was acquitted.
3 355 Ill. 421, 174 N. E. 529 (1930).
4 As collateral evidence of the trustee's lack of intent, the court pointed to his
offer in open court to make good the loss sustained by the certificate holders of the
first dividend. Other factors were said to be (1) that he made no personal use of
the money, (2) that the transactions did not benefit him in the slightest degree;
(3) that his acts were only for the benefit of the certificate holders; (4) that there
was no secrecy in his dealings; and (5) that notices of the dividend were sent to
all certificate holders.
5 342 Ill. 421, 174 N. E. 529 (1930).
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element of the crime of embezzlement; that great latitude should be allowed in proving such intent; but that the defendant should also be allowed
to show facts and circumstances designed to rebut the presumption that
he had committed the crime.
The case was marked by a strong dissent from Justice Daily who indicated that, in his opinion, the defendant's conduct in supplying the
deficits in the second and third dividend funds from the funds belonging to
the first dividend owners disclosed an intent to convert the funds to his own
use.0 He implied that the acts were secretly done from the fact that the
beneficiaries had no knowledge thereof. One would assume, as the dissenting judge indicates, that in rendering its decision the majority of the
court looked more nearly to what the trustee did not do instead of to what
7

he did do.

EVmENc--JuDICIAL

NOTICE-WHETHER

TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE SCIENTIFIC
CANNOT

CONTRACT

TRICHINOSIS

OR

NOT

A

COURT

FACT THAT A HUMAN

BY CONSUMING

PORK

SHOULD
BEING

WHICH HAS BEEN

PROPERLY C0OKED--The Appellate Court for the First District, by the

decision in the case of Nicketta v. National Tea Company,' has virtually
put an end to litigation heretofore begun by domestic consumers of pork
against the sellers of that product to recover damages for having contracted the dreaded food disease of trichinosis. The plaintiffs there
claimed they had purchased fresh pork from the defendant for home
consumption and, after eating it, had become infected with the disease.
The complaint charged the existence of an implied warranty between the
parties that the fresh pork would be fit for human consumption after it
had been properly cooked and that the product purchased had been so
processed, despite which plaintiffs had contracted trichinosis. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming it to be an
irrefutable scientific fact that properly cooked pork could never be the
source of the disease, so that, if the plaintiffs had suffered as claimed,
6

See Spalding v. People, 172 Ill. 40, 49 N. E. 993 (1898).

A question as to whether or not the period of limitation on prosecution had run
was also involved. The court decided that the three-year period fixed by Ill. Rev.
7

Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 630, had not expired even though the second deposit
occurred more than three years prior to the indictment. Following the view expressed in People ex rel. Nelson v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 353 Ill. 479, 187 N. E.
522 (1933), the court said that a trustee is presumed to use his own money before
that of the trust fund, so that the embezzlement would not be completed until the
entire deposits for all three of the dividends had been used up. The court ruled out

a possible application of the "first in first out" doctrine relating to bank deposits
on the basis that such doctrine rests on a debtor-creditor relationship.
1338 Ill. App. 159, 87 N. E. (2d) 30 (1949).
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it must have been because the pork was not adequately processed. Upon
that basis, it was urged that plaintiffs were in no position to take advantage
of the implied warranty as they could not, then, show any breach thereof.
The trial court, upon the hearing of the motion, took judicial notice of
the scientific fact so alleged to exist and, on the basis thereof, dismissed
the action. On appeal, that judgment was affirmed.
Trichinosis, a disease caused by the parasitic worm trichinetla spiralis,
can only be acquired by human beings through the consumption of pork
or pork products which contain trichinae. Once an individual becomes
infested, the result is a period of prolonged suffering which may, in severe
cases, cause death. 2 It has, however, long been well established by authoritative scientists, as well as by governmental tests, that the trichinae
cannot survive a heat in excess of 1370 Fahrenheit, so that the consumer
of pork or pork products may adequately safeguard himself by properly
cooking the meat before eating it.3 Accordingly, as far as the world of
science has been concerned, the presence of trichinosis in a human being
is regarded as conclusive evidence that the individual has consumed infested raw or improperly processed pork.
Acceptance of this scientific fact by way of judicial notice, at least
in the pleading stage of a case, is novel in the law of Illinois. Obviously,
a litigant claiming to be the victim of trichinosis should not be allowed
to recover as he cannot have brought himself within the scope of the existing implied warranty, to-wit: that pork when properly cooked will be fit
for human consumption.4 Until now, however, trial courts have permitted
the taking of evidence in such suits and have then submitted the issue to
the jury for determination. In those cases where a finding for the plain2 Schwartz, "A Disease Caused by Eating Raw Pork," U. S. Dept. of Agriculture,
Leaflet No. 34 (1941).
3 See "Trichinosis and Nonclinical Infections with Trichinella Spiralis," a report
by a special committee of the Advisory Council of Meat Research, in Am. Med.
Jour., Vol. 114, p. 35, particularly note 1. No feasible tests to determine the presence
of trichinae, without rendering the meat unusable, appear to exist: McCoy, Miller
and Friedlander, "The Use of An Intradermal Test in the Diagnosis of Trichiniases,"
Journ. of Immunology, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan., 1933).
4 The writer of the note in 16 Temple L. Q. 80 has suggested that the meat packing industry should shoulder the financial burden caused by the disease. A complete
analysis of the economic and social implications of such a proposition would be
necessary before it could be accepted as a solution. If that procedure were to be
adopted in trichinosis cases, it would be equally sound to urge acceptance thereof
in all negligence problems, thereby putting all cost of carelessness on society at
large rather than on the careless individual. Courts have generally refused to
extend the implied warranty beyond the point that it covers wholesomeness of meat
which has been properly processed: Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 247 F. 921 (1917) ;
Feinstein v. Daniel Reeves, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 167 (1936) ; Zorger v. Hillman's, Inc.,
287 Ill. App. 357, 4 N. E. (2d) 900 (1936) ; Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Packing Co., 267
Mich. 690, 255 N. W. 414 (1934) ; Tavani v. Swift & Co., 262 Pa. St. 184, 105 A. 55
(1918) ; Yachetti v. John Duff & Sons, Ltd. (1942), Ont. Rep. 682.
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tiff has been made, a reversal of the decision has occurred on appeal on
the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence.5 Reviewing
courts have there given judicial recognition to the fact that one cannot
contract the disease except through his own carelessness, but judicial
recognition of the doctrine was belated. 6 In the instant case, recognition
occurred at the proper moment with a consequent saving of time, money
and effort in the conduct of needless and expensive litigation.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS--PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL, AND REvrEwWHETHER

EXPIRATION

OF

TIME LIMIT

FOR

COMMENCEMENT

OF

ACTION

SERVES TO BAR THE FILING OF A COUNTERCLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-

The case of Wilson v. Tromly1 serves notice on those who would wait until
they are sued, before asserting any claim based on the Injuries Act 2 which
they might have against the plaintiff, that such delay may well prove
fatal to such claim. The action therein arose out of a collision which
occurred in Illinois on September 7, 1946, with fatal result to both drivers.
On September 4, 1947, within the year permitted by law, suit was filed
by the plaintiff as administrator for the estate of the Indiana decedent.
The defendant, administrator of the estate of the Illinois decedent,
brought no original suit but did, on October 4, 1947, within what would
ordinarily be an appropriate time, file an answer containing a counterclaim for wrongful death. A motion to strike the counterclaim was granted
on the ground that the latter was barred by law inasmuch as it purported to assert a claim not filed until after the expiration of one year
from the date of death. 3 A judgment that the defendant take nothing
under the counterclaim was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Fourth
District and, on leave to appeal, the judgment was again affirmed by the
Supreme Court. The latter held that a counterclaim for wrongful death,
being in effect an independent cause of action, had to be filed within the
time limit prescribed by statute, which time limit was a condition of liability and not merely a limitation on the remedy. For that reason, the
saving provisions of the Limitation Act 4 were said not to apply.
While the decision is one in which, for the first time in Illinois, it has
5 Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 247 F. 921 (1917) ; Weihardt v. Krey Packing Co.,

264 Ill. App. 504 (1932).

See also Lucey v. Harstedt, 270 App. Div. 900, 61 N. Y. S.

(2d) 157 (1946), affirmed in 296 N. Y. 810, 71 N. E. (2d) 775 (1947).

6 On the general subject of judicial notice, see 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 97.
1404 Ill. 307, 89 N. E. (2d) 23 (1949), affirming 336 Ill. App. 403, 84 N. E. (2d)
177 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW Rzvnmw 28-9.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 1.
3 Ibid., Ch. 70, § 2.

4 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 20.

RECENT ILLINOIS CASES

been held that a counterclaim for wrongful death filed after the year has
expired, albeit filed in an action begun in apt time, must be deemed barred,
the decision is merely a logical combination of two well recognized principles. The first of such principles is that a counterclaim is to be regarded
as a vehicle for the assertion of an independent cause of action.5 The
second declares that a suit brought under the Injuries Act does not come
within the class of actions enumerated in the Limitations Act, being sui
generis, hence must rest on the legislative enactment first mentioned and
be governed by the statutory conditions regulating the conduct of such
suits. 6 The first statement needs no comment, but, as to the second, some
explanation is necessary. The saving provisions of Sections 17 and 19
of the Limitation Act 7 must be read in connection with Section 12 thereof,
for that section impliedly limits the scope of the statute to those actions
specifically enumerated by expressly excluding the several periods of
limitation from applying when "a different limitation is prescribed by
statute."
It should also be remembered that statutes of limitation are
generally considered procedural in character, 8 and may be waived under
certain conditions, while statutes of survival are substantive in nature.9
For that reason, strict compliance with the latter is necessary for they
create rights to sue which did not exist at common law. Under no circumstances, therefore, can the provisions of the Limitation Act be said
to affect the essential condition imposed by the Injuries Act that suit
must be brought within one year. The fact that such action is filed in the
form of a counterclaim, even when filed in a suit brought in apt time,
will not extend that condition. Such a counterclaim can be sustained only
if it is filed within one year from the date of death.

5 Roberts Mine & Mill Co. v. Schrader, 95 F. (2d) 522 (1938) ; Groton Bridge Co.
v. American Bridge Co., 151 F. 871 (1907); Albrecht v. Dillon, 224 Ill. App. 421
(1922) ; Hoyle v. Carter, 215 N. C. 90, 1 S. E. (2d) 93 (1939) ; Pennsylvania Co. v.
Lynch, 308 Pa. 23, 162 A. 157 (1932).
s Hartray v. Chicago Railways Co., 290 Ill. 85, 124 N. E. 849 (1919); Carlin v.
Peerless Gaslight Co., 283 Ill. 142, 119 N. E. 66 (1918) ; McFadden v. St. Paul Coal
Co., 263 Ill. 441, 105 N. E. 314 (1914) ; Rhoads v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co., 227
fli. 328, 81 N. E. 371 (1907).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 18, permits a defendant to plead a counterclaim barred by the statutes of limitation, while held and owned by him, to any
action, the cause of which was owned by the plaintiff or person under whom he
claims, before such counterclaim was so barred. Section 20 thereof permits a cause
of action which survives to be brought against the administrator of the person
against whom such action lay within nine months after the issuing of letters of
administration.
8 Crampton v. D. V. Frione Co., 1 F. Supp. 989 (1932); Hillberg v. Industrial
Commission, 380 Ill. 102, 43 N. E. (2d) 671 (1942).
9 Ehlrich v. Merritt, 96 F. (2d) 251 (1938) ; Sanders v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co.,
111 F. 708 (1901).
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PLEADING--ISSUES, PROOF, AND VARIANCE-WHETHER OR NOT A PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT ON A PLEADING SETTING FORTH AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH, IN EFFECT, OPERATES TO DENY THE ALLEGA-

complaint in the recent case of Central
States Cooperatives, Inc. v. Watson Brothers Transportation Company,
TIONS OF THE COMPLAINT-The

Inc.,' alleged that the plaintiff had leased certain premises to the defendant
under a written agreement for a fixed term, which term had expired, and

that defendant continued in possession after the expiration date without
payment of any rent. Plaintiff sought a judgment for the reasonable rental
value of the premises and also for statutory double rent, available in the
case of a wilful holdover.' The defendant's answer set up, as an affirmative defense, 3 the existence of an oral rental agreement covering the period
of the holdover occupation of the premises and admitted liability for the
amount of rent specified in such contract, but denied all other allegations
of the complaint. The plaintiff moved for and, over objection, received
a partial judgment on the pleadings on the basis of such admission of
liability. 4

That decision was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the

First District on the ground that there could be no escape from the
liability to pay the admitted amount. The Supreme Court, having granted
defendant leave to appeal, reversed the decision and remanded the cause
for further proceedings.
The court, in substance, pointed out that the office of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is to permit the entry of a decision against
one who has failed to allege an adequate defense against a declared cause
of action. The complaint in the instant case alleged a wrongful holdover
and requested appropriate damages, to-wit: reasonable

rent.

The de-

fendant adequately denied the existence of that particular cause of action
by alleging the presence of an oral leasing agreement covering the period
of the alleged wrongful possession. It cannot be denied that possession
under an agreement negates a wrongful holding over. As nowhere, in
the answer, did the defendant admit the particular liability charged
to it, the final decision in the case would appear to be the proper one.
The case has deeper significance, however, in that it aptly serves to illustrate
the principle that one may not have relief under proof without allegation,
1404 Ill. 566, 90 N. E. (2d) 209 (1950), reversing 336 Il1. App. 314, 83 N. E. (2d)
752 (1949), noted in 28 CHIcAGo-KFNT LAW REVIEW 35-6.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 80, § 2.

3 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(4), requires the defendant to plead, as an affirmative
defense, any matter which would, if not so pleaded, be "likely to take the opposite
party by surprise."
4 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 181, permits the entry of a partial judgment where the defense
is "to a part only of the denmand." Italics added.
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nor under allegation
pursuing a particular
been nullified despite
tofore existed between

The necessity for adopting and
without proof.5
theory throughout a course of pleadings has not
an apparent abolition of distinctions which herethe prior forms of action.'

RECORDS--REGISTRATION
TAx FORECLOSURE

SALE

COMPLIANCE

OF TITLES TO LAND--WHETHER

WITH THE REVENUE ACT BY A PURCHASER
OBVIATES THE

OF REGISTERED

NECESSITY

OF

REALTY AT A

ADDITIONAL

COM-

PLIANCE WITH THE TORRENS AcT-Tax foreclosure proceedings were instituted, in the case of People v. Mortenson,' against realty in Cook County
which had been registered under the Torrens Act.2 Sale of the property
was ordered for non-payment of taxes and it was decreed that, upon the
expiration of a two-year period of redemption, whoever became the holder
of the certificate of purchase would, upon compliance with the provisins of the Revenue Act, 3 be entitled to a deed. One Klopfer, not previously an owner of the property, purchased at the sale and, upon
He subseconfirmation thereof, received a certificate of purchase.
quently proceeded in accordance with the Revenue Act, serving all necessary notices and paying all subsequent taxes levied on the property,
but failed to comply with the Torrens Act in that he did not register
the certificate of sale within one year from the date of the tax sale. 4 Upon
expiration of the redemption period, Kolopfer sought the issuance of a
deed to the premises but his application was denied by the county clerk
on the ground that he had released his rights by failing to register the
certificate of purchase. The Circuit Court of Cook County, still having
jurisdiction over the tax foreclosure proceedings, upheld the action of the
clerk. Upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court, for questions of freehold and of revenue were involved, the decree was affirmed.
The main contention of the certificate holder was that as he had fully
complied with the original order, having proceeded in accordance with
the Revenue Act, and because no rights of innocent third parties were
involved, his failure to register the certificate of purchase in. the Torrens
5 Leitch v. Sanitary District, 386 Ill. 433, 54 N. E. (2d) 458 (1944).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 155.
1404 Ill. 107, 88 N. E. (2d) 35 (1949).
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 45 et seq.
3 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 744.

4 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 119, directs:

"The holder of any certificate of sale of

registered land ...
shall . . . within one year from the date of any such sale ...
present the same ...
to the registrar . . . Unless such certificate is presented and

registered .

.

. within the time above mentioned, the land shall be forever released

from the effect of such sale, and no deed shall be issued in pursuance of such
certificate."
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office should not act as a forfeiture of his right to a deed. The Supreme
Court pointed out, however, that the fundamental legislative intent, at
the time of enacting the Torrens Act, was to develop an ideal recording
system wherein the interest of any person in a particular piece of realty
could be registered in one location. In order to effectuate this purpose
it was necessary to force all individuals who might claim title, by reason
of tax sale or otherwise, to register their claims within a reasonable period
of time. The necessary element of coercion was, of course, to be found
in the fact that non-compliance would result in the forfeiture of all right
to the realty. While the decision might seem extremely harsh, inasmuch
as it inflicts a severe penalty upon one who is called upon to abide by,
but fails to observe, more than one legislative requirement, it is clearly
consistent with the fundamental objectives of a Torrens system of land
registration.

REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS-RIGHTS OF ACTION AND DEFENSES-

WHETHER ONE BENEFICIARY MAY HAVE A VOLUNTARY DEED IN TRUST
REFORMED, AS AGAINST A Co-BENEFICIARY, So AS TO CORRECT A SCRIVENER'S
MISTAKE-In the recent case of Reinberg v. Heiby' it appeared that the
donor had, at separate times, acquired two adjacent tracts of land having
areas of four acres and twenty acres respectively. He wished the land to
go, after his death, to his two daughters, plaintiff and defendant therein,
in the form of two individually owned tracts of twelve acres each. To
effectuate this purpose, he hired a surveyor to so divide the land and then
retained a lawyer to set up a land trust with direction to the trustee, after
the donor's death, to make conveyance to the daughters in accordance with
his plan of distribution. The daughters were fully informed as to the plan,
but the donor's lawyer, when drawing up the trust papers, inadvertently
described the lands as they had originally been described when purchased
rather than as the two twelve-acre plots referred to in the plat of survey.
Upon donor's death, the trustee tendered to plaintiff a deed for only four
acres and gave defendant a deed for twenty acres in accordance with the
direction of the trust instrument as drawn, at which time the scrivener 's
mistake was discovered. Plaintiff sued to reform the trust agreement and
the deeds to defendant and herself so as to make the same conform to the
intention of the donor. The trial court ordered reformation and, on direct
appeal to the Supreme Court, the decree was affirmed. The defendant had
argued that as the plaintiff had paid nothing, plaintiff had lost nothing by
the mistake and hence should fail. The doctrine is well established that a
1404 Il1. 247, 88 N. E. (2d) 848 (1949).
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court of equity will not entertain an action by a voluntary grantee to

reform a deed for mistake, as against the grantor or anyone claiming under
him,2 for to permit such an action would result in enlarging the bounty of
a recipient at the expense of and against the interest of the donor-grantor
and would, in a sense, result in compelling specific performance of a
promise to make a gift.3 That doctrine was held inapplicable to the instant
case, however, on the ground that the suit was not directed against the
donor, who had parted with the entire title to the property, but was more
nearly a suit to prevent one voluntary grantee from becoming unjustly
enriched at the expense of another voluntary grantee, contrary to the
donor's intention. The Illinois court, facing the particular situation for
the first time, appropriately corrected the manifest error by limiting the
use of the doctrine aforementioned to suits directed against the grantor or
those claiming through or under the grantor.

2 Marvin v. Kelsey, 373 Ill. 589, 27 N. E. (2d) 469, 128 A. L. R. 1295 (1940);
Stanforth v. Bailey, 344 Ill. 38, 175 N. E. 784 (1931) ; Henry v. Henry, 215 Il. 205,
74 N. E. 126 (1905) ; Strayer v. Dickerson, 205 Ill. 257, 68 N. E. 767 (1903).
3 In general, see 45 Am. Jur., Reformation of Instruments, § 28.

